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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND 
JOB SEARCH
James C. Cox and Ronald L. Oaxaca
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the relationship between unemployment insurance (Ul) 
benefits and the duration of unemployment. We review extant empirical evidence 
on the question of whether the receipt of Ul benefits leads unemployed workers 
to prolong their spells of unemployment. Our objective is to examine representa­
tive studies of Ul and worker job search responses with an eye toward eliciting 
implications for public policy and future research.
The current Ul system was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 in 
response to the hardships imposed on the workforce by the Great Depression. 
Subject to minimum standards set by the federal government, the state govern­
ments administer the program and set their own requirements regarding eligibili­
ty and compensation. Funding for the program is derived from payroll taxes 
assessed against employers of covered workers. At the present time, well over 
90% of wage and salary workers are covered by the Ul system. Important 
eligibility requirements for covered workers who are unemployed include mini­
mum earnings and employment over a base period preceding a spell of unem­
ployment. In addition, states require a waiting period of one or two weeks before
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a claimant can begin receiving UI compensation. Within legislated minimum and 
maximum amounts, an unemployed worker’s UI benefits are proportional to his 
or her previous earnings. The maximum duration of benefits is typically 26 
weeks but can be higher in some cases. UI benefits have been subject to federal 
income taxes since 1978. Income maintenance and subsidization of job search 
are two objectives associated with the UI system. UI promotes income mainte­
nance by providing a financial cushion for laid-off workers awaiting recall. UI 
assists workers on permanent layoff by financing job search; this is intended to 
promote better job matches than would be the case in the absence of the UI 
subsidy.
A disconcerting feature of empirical analysis of UI data is the wide range of 
estimated effects of policies and programs that abound in the literature. These 
disparate results stem from, among other things, differences in data sets, model 
specifications, time periods, and estimation techniques. One common finding in 
the studies reviewed below is a positive association between length of spells of 
unemployment and the receipt of UI benefits. However, this still leaves open the 
question of how to characterize the underlying behavior of unemployed workers. 
Two competing hypotheses have been suggested in the past: (1) UI benefits 
constitute a subsidy to leisure; and (2) UI benefits constitute a subsidy to job 
search. These competing hypotheses have implications for labor market efficien­
cy and public policy.
Underlying the leisure subsidy argument is the basic static model of consumer 
choice of consumption and leisure (Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982). The income 
loss from a spell of unemployment overstates the value of the utility loss from 
reduced earnings. This is because of the value of the utility gain from the (forced) 
additional consumption of leisure. Hence, unemployment can have some value to 
workers because of the leisure consumption it makes possible. According to this 
view, UI benefits increase the attractiveness of unemployment by reducing the 
opportunity cost of leisure. Empirically, one would expect to find a positive 
association between UI and unemployment duration, and a clustering of unem­
ployment terminations around the week of UI benefit exhaustion. In this frame­
work, an increase in the potential maximum of UI benefit duration will have 
income and substitution effects for those who would otherwise have exhausted 
their entitlements. The consumption/leisure choice model predicts that, if leisure 
is a normal good, then the extension of potential duration of UI benefits will 
necessarily raise the duration of unemployment.
Job search theory holds that unemployed workers are searching for jobs in a 
manner that maximizes the present value of expected utility (expected income for 
a risk-neutral worker) from search (Mortensen, 1986). UI benefits serve to re­
duce the opportunity costs of the search process and can lead unemployed work­
ers to search longer and hold out for better job offers. This model also predicts a 
positive association between UI benefits and the duration of unemployment as 
well as some clustering of unemployment terminations around the week of UI
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benefit exhaustion. Also, an extension of maximum-benefit duration is predicted 
to lead to a longer spell of unemployment. Empirically, the job search model is 
distinguished from the leisure subsidy model by the prediction that UI benefits 
will produce better job matches including higher postunemployment wages. Our 
review will examine the available empirical evidence of the effects of Ul on 
unemployment duration in light of these two alternative models. The papers 
included in our review were selected to be representative of the approaches taken 
to understanding the link between UI and job search. Our selection criteria also 
included the prominence of particular papers in the literature and whether the 
studies were funded by the UI service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
The remainder of our paper is divided into three parts. Section II is a review 
and summary of nonexperimental empirical studies of the effects of the current 
UI program. Section III reviews completed and ongoing laboratory and field 
experiments on job search behavior and possible changes in the UI program. 
Section IV is a discussion of the research and program policy implications of 
what has been learned to date about the incentive effects of UI at the level of the 
individual worker.
II. REPRESENTATIVE NONEXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimated the effects of UI benefit payments on 
postunemployment wages, duration of unemployment, and time spent out of the 
labor force. This study used 1966-1971 data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) on four gender/age cohorts: males 14-24 and 45-59, and females 
14-24 and 30-44. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca specified their UI variable as a wage 
replacement fraction, i.e., the ratio of weekly UI benefits to preunemployment 
weekly wages. Here we confine our summary to the Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 
results pertaining to workers who completed their spells of unemployment by 
changing employers.
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca estimated the effects of raising the wage replacement 
fraction by 10 percentage points, from 0.4 to 0.5. If one takes a base wage 
replacement fraction of 0.5, this represents a 20% increase in UI weekly bene­
fits. Such an increase was estimated by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca to raise the 
duration of unemployment (in weeks) by 0.2, 1.5, 0.5, and 0.3 for males 14-24, 
males 45-59, females 14-24, and females 30-44. The wage gain effects of this 
increase in UI benefits were estimated to be 7% for males 45-59 and 1.5% for 
females 30-44, respectively. Among the 14-24-year-olds, the wage replacement 
ratio had no statistically significant effects on wage gains. Finally, this increase 
in weekly UI benefits was estimated to reduce time spent out of the labor force by 
0.8 weeks for females 14-24 and 0.7 weeks for females 30-44. This effect was 
not estimated for the older male group and was not statistically significant for the 
young males.
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As far as the job search interpretation is concerned, the Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 
results are somewhat mixed. The lack of Ul-induced wage gains for young 
workers is consistent with any of the following explanations: (a) job search 
among young people is simply unproductive; (b) young people use their subsi­
dized spells of unemployment to search for jobs with better on-the-job training 
opportunities at the cost of initially lower postunemployment wages; and (c) U1 
is serving as a subsidy to leisure for young people. The Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 
study does not shed much light on which (if any) of these alternative explanations 
is correct. However, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca observe that the apparent substitu­
tion of unemployment for time out of the labor force by the young women is 
consistent with the leisure subsidy argument. In the two cases for older workers 
in which U1 benefits were associated with wage gains, the magnitudes of these 
effects are implausibly large. The wage gain effects imply that an additional 
week of search induced by UI is associated with a 5% wage gain. One factor 
underlying these anomalous results could be that the NLS data used by Ehren­
berg and Oaxaca did not permit any control for the effect of Ul on search 
intensity.
Burgess and Kingston (1976) estimated the impact of the weekly benefit 
amount (WBA) on the duration of compensated employment using data from the 
1969-1970 Service to Claimants (STC) experiment. The sample consisted of UI 
claimants who had not exhausted their benefits and who were deemed “job 
ready” but not “job attached.” Since the design of the STC experiment was 
intended to test the effects of special job search assistance to UI claimants and not 
to test the effects of UI itself on search outcomes, we discuss the Burgess and 
Kingston results here rather than in Section III. The Burgess and Kingston 
estimates imply that an additional $10 of WBA raises subsequent annual earnings 
by $250. A problem here is that the duration of compensated weeks of unemploy­
ment was included as a control variable by Burgess and Kingston in their wage 
gain equations. According to search theory, wage gain and duration of search are 
jointly determined. Consequently, Welch (1977) applied a rough correction to the 
Burgess and Kingston estimates and came up with estimates that implied that the 
total effect of an additional $10 inWBA raises subsequent annual earnings by 
$180 to $200.
Another study by Burgess and Kingston (1981) used the STC data in estimat­
ing the effects of WBA on compensated weeks of unemployment after control­
ling for a worker’s maximum duration of benefits. This study found that an 
additional $10 of WBA raises the duration of compensated unemployment by 
0.15 weeks. Combining this effect with the Burgess and Kingston earlier wage 
gain estimates implies that an additional week of compensated unemployment 
raises annual earnings between $1200 and $1300. Burgess and Kingston esti­
mated that an additional week of potential benefit duration raises compensated 
unemployment by 0.61 weeks. Some differences by demographic characteristics 
were evident from the Burgess and Kingston 1981 study. WBA effects on com­
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pensated unemployment tended to decrease with age while the potential duration 
effects on compensated unemployment tended to increase with age. Both the 
WBA and potential duration effects tended to be larger among nonwhites.
Classen (1977) sought to determine the effects of U1 benefits on unemploy­
ment duration and earnings by taking advantage of the fact that legislated in­
creases in maximum UI benefits took place in 1968. She used the Continuous 
Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) data set for 1960-1970. The duration vari­
able was measured as weeks of Ul benefits collected per successful claim, the UI 
variable was the WBA, and the earnings variable was high-quarter earnings in 
the year following a completed spell of unemployment. Using data for Arizona 
and Pennsylvania, Classen estimated that a $10 (1968 dollars) increase in WBA 
would cause an increase in benefit duration of 1.1 weeks in both states but have 
no significant effect on earnings in either state. Although the Classen and Ehren­
berg and Oaxaca studies differ in many respects, they yield similar estimated 
overall effects of UI on duration. In addition to the lack of an earnings effect from 
UI, Classen’s study cast further doubt on the productivity-enhancing effects of UI 
by failing to find any UI effect on the number of employers a worker had in the 
two-year period following a spell of unemployment. It was expected that if UI 
promoted better job matches, workers would have fewer employers following 
spells of insured unemployment.
Holen (1977) estimated the effects of UI benefits and potential weeks of 
eligibility on unemployment duration and subsequent wages using data from the 
STC experiment. Her results imply that a $10 (1969-1970 dollars) rise in WBA 
would raise compensated unemployment by about one week and quarterly earn­
ings by $90. In other words, each additional week of Ul-induced search raises 
quarterly earnings by $90. Holen conjectured that the wage gain effect reflected 
some combination of an extra week of search and increased search intensity. Her 
estimates also imply that extending the maximum potential eligibility period by 
one week would raise compensated weeks of unemployment duration by 0.8 
weeks and quarterly earnings by $2.50. Holen investigated whether the exten­
sion of potential entitlement had any effect on search behavior. Her results sug­
gested that the probability of short spells of unemployment was reduced and the 
distribution of total search duration was shifted toward longer spells of 
unemployment.
Hamermesh (1979) examined the entitlement effects of UI availability on labor 
supply and labor force participation among married women. The idea is that 
potential UI benefits make market work more attractive. Hamermesh drew a 
sample from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the period 1967-1971. His 
sample consisted of married white women between the ages of 30 and 54, who 
were married to the same husband from 1967 to 1972 and who resided in the 
same state from 1970 to 1972. For the entire sample, Hamermesh simulated the 
effects of a 20% increase in UI benefits. He estimated the resulting disincentive 
effects on total hours of work and the positive entitlement effects on labor supply
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and labor force participation. While the net effects are slightly negative, it is hard 
to escape the conclusion that they are not significantly different from zero.
Solon (1978) questioned the desirability of measuring the work disincentive 
effects of the UI system by looking only at the unemployment effects. If the UI 
system encourages labor force participation among those who would otherwise 
be out of the labor force, the estimated UI effects on unemployment would 
overstate the true disincentive effects as measured by employment effects. Solon 
used data for a sample of former UI claimants in the state of New York who had 
established benefit years over the period September 1972 to August 1973, and 
who had also exhausted their 26 weeks of regular UI benefit entitlement. He 
found a marginally statistically significant negative effect of extended UI benefit 
eligibility on subsequent weeks of employment. His results indicated that for 
every ten weeks of extended benefit eligibility, employment was reduced by one 
week. This effect was mainly confined to those who had received UI benefits in 
two of the previous five years (repeaters). Solon’s estimates of work disincen­
tives were smaller than what one would have inferred on the basis of unemploy­
ment effects because of the out-of-the labor force effects.
Fishe and Maddala (1980) estimated the effects of UI benefits on the duration 
of unemployment from a structural model of joint wage offer and reservation 
wage determination. They explicitly incorporated the assumption of finite search 
horizons among unemployed workers in contrast to the infinite-horizon specifi­
cation implicitly or explicitly used by most researchers. Fishe and Maddala used 
a CWBH data set for a sample of workers in Florida who had been unemployed 
at some point between 1971 and 1975. The UI benefits variable in the Fishe and 
Maddala study is defined as the potential weekly benefit amount (PWBA) an 
unemployed worker is eligible for (equal to WBA for actual periods of compen­
sation). Fishe and Maddala’s results imply that a 20% rise in PWBA raises the 
weekly reservation wage by 2.8% of the average weekly wage and increases the 
duration of unemployment by 1.4 weeks. Furthermore, the exhaustion of UI 
benefits was estimated to drop the weekly reservation wage by 16.4% of the 
average weekly wage. Fishe and Maddala found that the number of weeks 
remaining until UI exhaustion was positively related to the reservation wage and 
was statistically significant. As each week passes without a job acceptance, the 
weekly reservation wage declines by 1.4%. This result was interpreted as evi­
dence of a declining reservation wage over the search horizon. Fishe and Mad­
dala treated the finite search horizon as a parameter that they estimated to be 40.9 
weeks.
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) examined the impact of changing the maximum 
duration of UI benefit eligibility on the duration of unemployment. The labor/ 
leisure choice (or leisure subsidy) model provided the theoretical underpinning 
for the employment (or labor supply) function in their study. A maximum- 
likelihood estimation procedure was used to incorporate the kink in the unem­
ployed worker’s budget line at the point of maximum UI benefit duration eligibil­
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ity. Data for the study were drawn from a sample of workers who collected UI 
benefits under the Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program. A negative 
estimated coefficient on the non-UI, nonwage income variable indicates that 
leisure is indeed a normal good. Moffitt and Nicholson estimated that increasing 
potential UI benefit duration by one week raises weeks unemployed by 0.1 
weeks. This result implies that the 26-week extension of maximum duration of 
UI benefits triggered by the FSB program in response to the 1974-1975 reces­
sion increased unemployment duration by about 2.5 weeks. Moffitt and Nich­
olson also found that a 10% increase in the net wage replacement ratio would 
raise the duration of unemployment by 0.4 weeks for those with high proba­
bilities of benefit exhaustion and by about 0.8 to 1 week for the typical claimant.
Feldstein and Poterba (1984) examined two major issues. The first is the 
existence of evidence that indicates that a significant proportion of unemployed 
workers hold unrealistically high and socially nonoptimal reservation wages. 
While one might question whether some of these individuals should be consid­
ered unemployed, they are nevertheless counted as unemployed according to the 
official definition of unemployment. The second issue is whether UI benefits 
exacerbate the problem of nonoptimal reservation wages by raising them further 
and hence prolonging unemployment.
Feldstein and Poterba used data obtained from a special supplement to the May 
1976 Current Population Survey (CPS). Unemployed workers were asked to 
indicate the kind of work they were seeking and the lowest wage they would 
accept to do the specified work. From this group, Feldstein and Poterba selected a 
subsample of those unemployed who were receiving UI benefits. A reservation 
wage variable was constructed as the ratio of the reported reservation wage to the 
last wage received prior to the current spell of unemployment. Feldstein and 
Poterba constructed their UI variable as the ratio of WBA received to the pre­
vious wage adjusted for a constant marginal tax rate of 0.3.
Regression analysis by Feldstein and Poterba revealed that the UI wage re­
placement variable had a statistically significant positive effect on the reservation 
wage ratio for each of the groups of UI recipients in the sample ( “job losers on 
layoff,” “other job losers,” and “job leavers”). Predictably, the UI effect was 
largest for “other job losers.” For a worker in this latter category whose gross UI 
wage replacement ratio was 0.5 (0.7 after taxes), a 20% rise in WBA would 
increase the reservation wage by 6% of the previous wage. Feldstein and Poterba 
also found that the UI net wage replacement ratio had a positive statistically 
significant effect on the probability that an unemployed worker would have a 
reservation wage ratio in excess of 1.0. For the same worker as described above, 
a 20% increase in WBA would raise the probability that the reservation wage 
ratio exceeds 1.0 by 5 percentage points (31% of the “other job losers” sample 
had reservation wage ratios in excess of 1.0).
Moffitt (1985) attempted to deal with the problem of wide-ranging estimates of 
UI effects. Specifically, Moffitt focused on the effects of the maximum potential
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duration of benefits. His study adopted a uniform specification and estimation 
strategy across four selected data sets. The objective was to generate a narrower 
range of U1 eifects as well as to ascertain how much of the differences in 
estimates can be attributed to differences in data bases. The four data sets used 
were (1) CWBH (1978-1983), (2) the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project 
(EOPP) (1979-1981), (3) the Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) Follow-Up 
Survey (1975-1977), and (4) the Newton-Rosen data set (1974-1976). Moffitt’s 
study yielded estimated effects of an additional week of potential duration of U1 
benefits that ranged from 0.17 to 0.45 additional weeks of unemployment for 
males and 0.10 to 0.37 additional weeks of unemployment for females. There 
was some hint that these effects were somewhat larger when the unemployment 
rate was higher. Moffitt also found that the effect of an additional week of 
potential duration on combined weeks of unemployment and out of the labor 
force was 0.52 weeks for males and 0.66 weeks for females. He found no strong 
evidence that increased potential duration had any effect on the labor supply of 
other members of a U1 recipient’s family. Finally, Moffitt failed to find any 
convincing evidence of an effect of potential duration on postunemployment 
earnings.
Katz and Meyer (1988) used hazard rate analysis to estimate the impact of 
potential duration and UI benefit level on the duration of compensated unemploy­
ment and on the timing of exits from unemployment. They used two data sources 
for their study: (1) a sample of heads of households from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) over the period 1980-1981, and (2) a sample of males 
from the CWBH data for 1978-1983 supplemented by an additional CWBH data 
set covering the period 1979-1984. They found sharp spikes among UI recip­
ients in the escape rates from unemployment at about the duration when UI 
benefits were exhausted (26 and 39 weeks). No such sharp pattern in escape rates 
was found for non UI recipients. Although the statistical significances of the 
potential duration and UI benefit level in the hazard models were marginal, the 
estimated effects were in the anticipated directions. Katz and Meyer’s results 
imply that a one-week increase in potential duration would raise compensated 
duration by 0.16 to 0.20 weeks and that a 20% rise in UI for an individual with a 
replacement ratio of 0.5 would increase the length of a compensated spell of 
unemployment by 1.5 weeks.
111. FIELD AND LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS
Applied econometric studies of the effects of UI, such as those reviewed in 
Section II, establish statistical associations between UI benefits and unemploy­
ment duration, wage gains, and other variables of interest to policymakers. 
However, interpretations of these results in terms of search intensity, labor/ 
leisure substitutions, etc., require the use of theoretical models as maintained
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hypotheses. Many econometric studies of UI employ either a finite- or an infin­
ite-horizon search model as a maintained hypothesis (Devine and Kiefer, 1988). 
Therefore, if the job search/job acceptance behavior of economic agents is not 
consistent with the search models, then the interpretations of the results of the 
applied research can be misleading. Hence, it is essential that search models be 
subjected to direct empirical testing to learn whether they can be falsified.
The literature contains some very ingenious studies that use econometric tech­
niques designed to test search models with data from the historical record. 
Among these are Kiefer and Neumann (1979a,b), Warner et al. (1980), and 
Lancaster and Chesher (1983). However, the properties of search models pose 
inherent limitations on what can be learned with this approach. Consider some of 
the difficulties in attempting to use nonexperimental data to test job search 
theory. The models imply that the feasibility of recalling past wage offers, the 
length of the search horizon, and/or agent information about the distribution of 
wage offers are central determinants of an optimal search strategy. But pos­
sibilities of wage offer recall, the length of search horizons, and agent informa­
tion on wage offer distributions are not observable in nonexperimental data 
sources. Hence such data are not very useful for learning whether job search 
models can be falsified by observations of job search behavior. In contrast, 
controlled experiments have some unique advantages for empirical evaluation of 
search models. The relative advantages of laboratory experiments and field ex­
periments are somewhat different, and thus we will discuss both types.
Laboratory experiments designed to test finite-horizon search models were 
conducted by Cox and Oaxaca (1989a,b). In these experiments the researchers 
can control, and thereby observe, the possibility of recalling past wage offers, the 
length of the search horizon, and agent information about the wage offers dis­
tribution. Also under experimental control are theoretically hypothesized deter­
minants of search behavior such as the discounting rate of interest and the cost or 
subsidy to search. Thus, such laboratory experiments are well-suited for learning 
whether people are capable of making choices in a dynamic, uncertain decision 
environment as if they were finding the optimal solutions to stochastic dynamic 
decision problems. This is the type of behavior that is modeled in job search 
theory and that is used as a maintained hypothesis in much econometric research 
on UI.
The Cox and Oaxaca (1989a) laboratory experiments were conducted with 60 
subjects who participated in base line and various treatment trials. The experi­
mental treatments consisted of variation of the rate of interest, the subsidy to 
search, the riskiness of the wage offers distribution, the probability of obtaining a 
job offer, and the length of the search horizon. The picture that emerges from 
these experiments is one of reasonably close agreement between the predictions 
of the risk-neutral search model and observed subject behavior. Overall, subjects 
terminated search exactly at the point predicted by the risk-neutral model in 77% 
of 600 trials. However, there was significant evidence of risk-averse behavior.
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The risk-averse or risk-neutral (concave) model survived the experimental tests 
remarkably well. Fully 94% of the search terminations in 600 trials were con­
sistent with this concave search model. The accuracy of the concave search 
model in predicting search behavior is supported by several parametric and 
nonparametric tests reported in the paper.
The theory of optimal job search focuses on reservation wages. But the typical 
message space of both naturally occurring labor markets and job search experi­
ments includes admissible statements of job oifer acceptance and rejection, not 
statements of (binding) reservation wages. Cox and Oaxaca (1989b) present the 
results of experiments designed for direct tests of the reservation wage property 
of a finite-horizon sequential search model. Since precommitment may frame the 
acceptance/rejection decision in an unfamiliar way, precommitment is intro­
duced as an experimental treatment, with base line control, in order to test for 
any framing effects on search decisions. Overall, the results of the Cox and 
Oaxaca (1989b) precommitment experiments confirm the findings from the no­
precommitment search experiments reported in Cox and Oaxaca (1989a). That is, 
the linear (risk-neutral) model and especially the concave (risk-neutral or risk­
averse) search model are good predictors of both reservation wages and search 
terminations. Precommitment effects are initially present but they attenuate in 
subsequent experimental trials. The precommitment effect takes the form of 
earlier (than in base line) search terminations. The data base generated from the 
paired no-precommitment/precommitment experiments is also used to evaluate 
various econometric procedures for estimating reservation wages from job accep­
tance data.
There are six field experiments with the UI program that have either recently 
been completed or are currently at some stage of planning or implementation. 
The first of these was the completed Illinois reemployment bonus experiment. 
Further experiments with alternative bonus formulas are currently in progress in 
Washington. The completed New Jersey experiments involved several treatments 
that included combinations of reemployment bonuses, job search assistance, job 
training, and relocation assistance. The New Jersey experiments were targeted on 
structurally unemployed workers. Experiments currently in progress in Pennsyl­
vania involve treatments that use alternative reemployment bonus formulas and 
job search assistance. Two other experiments that are currently in progress are the 
Washington and the Three State Self-Employment Demonstration Projects. 
These experiments involve treatments that consist of self-employment allow­
ances and various support services to assist UI recipients who want to become 
self-employed. The Illinois and New Jersey experiments are the only ones for 
which results are currently available; hence we will focus our discussion on these 
two.
Results from the Illinois experiment are presented in Spiegelman and Woodb­
ury (1987) and Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987). In this experiment, indi­
viduals in a selected subset of UI claimants were randomly assigned to one of
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two treatment groups or a control group. An individual who was assigned to the 
claimant treatment group was eligible for a $500 reemployment bonus if he or 
she returned to work with either his or her old employer or a new employer 
within 11 weeks of filing the U1 claim and remained on that job for at least four 
months. If an employer hired an individual who was assigned to the employer 
treatment group then the employer was eligible for a $500 bonus if the worker 
met the 11-week and four-month filing and employment conditions. Bonus- 
qualifying jobs for both treatment groups had to provide at least 30 hours per 
week of employment.
The results of the Illinois experiment support the conclusion that reemploy­
ment bonuses can significantly affect the job-finding behavior of UI recipients. 
Individuals in the claimant treatment group had an average of 1.37 fewer weeks 
of unemployment than those in the control group during the first spell and 1.15 
fewer weeks during the benefit year. The average differences between the em­
ployer treatment and control groups were 0.67 weeks in the first spell and 0.36 
weeks during the benefit year. All of these figures except the 0.36 benefit year 
figure are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Further­
more, the three significant reductions in weeks of unemployment also involve 
significant reductions in total UI benefits paid out, inclusive of the $500 bonuses. 
In addition, the lower average number of weeks of unemployment for the treat­
ment groups does not appear to have been achieved at the cost of lower post­
unemployment earnings.
Further analysis of data from the Illinois experiment is presented in Meyer 
(1988). He also discusses some ways in which the results of this field experiment 
might not be indicative of the effects of a permanent national reemployment 
bonus program. The Illinois experiment lasted only 17 weeks and was not pub­
licized; hence it is unlikely that it induced firms to change their layoff and recall 
policies. However, if recalled workers were eligible for bonuses in a permanent 
program, this would provide a substantial subsidy to temporary layoffs. The 
responses by firms and workers to the incentive provided by this subsidy might 
lead to a substantial increase in UI claims. In contrast, if recalled workers were 
not eligible for bonuses (as in the New Jersey and Washington experiments) this 
would provide an incentive to break up employer/employee matches. Any re­
sponse to this incentive by workers would increase UI claims and impose other 
costs on the economy. However, there could be an offsetting effect on firms in 
that they might reduce layoff frequency in order to avoid having their employees 
respond to the bonus incentive to join other firms.
Results from the New Jersey experiment are reported in Corson et al. (1988). 
In this experiment, individuals in a selected subset of UI claimants were ran­
domly assigned to one of three treatment groups or a control group. The three 
experimental treatments were (1) job search assistance, (2) job search assistance 
combined with training or relocation assistance, and (3) job search assistance 
combined with a reemployment bonus. The eligibility screens that were used in
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selecting individuals for inclusion in the experiment were intended to select 
displaced workers (the target group). This was partially successful although other 
UI recipients were included. Not surprisingly, the experimental treatments were 
more effective for individuals not in the target group.
The reemployment bonus formula in the New Jersey experiment was different 
than the one used in the Illinois experiment that is described above. The New 
Jersey bonus formula offered individuals one-half of their remaining UI entitle­
ment if they started work by the end of the second full week following the 
assessment/counseling interview. This implies that bonus eligibility began about 
the seventh week after an eligible claimant filed for UI. The amount that could be 
claimed during the first week of bonus eligibility averaged $1644. In subsequent 
weeks the bonus declined by about 10% of the original amount each week.
Data from the New Jersey experiment indicates that each of three experimental 
treatments significantly reduced both the number of weeks that claimants col­
lected UI and the amount that they collected. Furthermore, the treatment with the 
reemployment bonus had the largest effect in reducing both weeks of UI duration 
and dollars of UI paid. The results also indicate that all three treatments increase 
both employment and earnings in the year following the UI claim. Thus the 
experimental treatments do not appear to have lowered reservation wages. Final­
ly, various benefit-cost analyses are reported. They indicate that none of the 
treatments led to positive net benefits for the Labor Department. However, two 
of the treatments yielded positive net benefits for the government sector and, 
most importantly, all three of the treatments yielded positive net benefits to 
society as a whole and to claimants.
Although the results of the Illinois and New Jersey experiments appear to be 
favorable, Meyer (1988) explains why these results do not support policy conclu­
sions. Both of these experiments were short-lived and were not widely advertised 
to workers and firms. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that neither workers nor 
firms made strategic responses to the existence of the experimental treatments. 
However, the possibility of such strategic responses to a permanent program 
implies that the results of the experiments might not be a good predictor of the 
impacts of a permanent program.
Consider the possibility of strategic responses by workers to a permanent 
reemployment bonus program. The bonus formulas from the New Jersey and 
Illinois experiments provide good examples to illustrate the problem. The New 
Jersey bonus became available in the seventh week after a UI claim was filed. 
The average initial bonus of $1644 was about five-weeks’ average wages. Thus, 
anyone who was planning to start a job after two weeks of UI could increase his 
or her income by waiting a few more weeks to become eligible for the bonus. In 
contrast, the Illinois bonus was available immediately after a UI claim was filed. 
Immediate availability of a bonus would provide an incentive for some people to 
file UI claims who otherwise might not file. The most obvious example of this 
would be someone who had a new job lined up upon termination of the previous
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job. With either type of strategic response, the larger number of benefit payments 
caused by added claimants might eliminate any cost savings of a bonus program. 
Therefore, the findings of positive net benefits for reemployment bonuses in the 
Illinois and New Jersey experiments do not support the prediction that a perma­
nent bonus program of either type would yield positive net benefits.
Another question that was not addressed by the Illinois and New Jersey experi­
ments is the possibility of displacement effects. That is, individuals in the experi­
mental treatment groups who found jobs more quickly may have done so at the 
expense of others who took longer to find jobs. Any such displacement effects 
would detract from the calculated net benefits of the experimental treatments. 
The Pennsylvania experiment will attempt to examine this question by comparing 
the experiences of the control groups to similar groups in other labor markets. It 
remains to be seen whether this can be done effectively.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY
For all of the many differences in techniques, model specifications, time periods, 
and data sets that characterize empirical studies of U1 effects on individual 
workers, it is remarkable that these studies all point to the same qualitative effect 
of UI benefits on work incentives: UI prolongs spells of unemployment and 
lowers employment among its recipients. Unfortunately, the magnitudes of these 
estimated effects vary more than one would like. Consider a 20% increase in 
WBA for a UI claimant with a wage replacement rate of 0.5. Based on the 
studies we reviewed, the estimated duration effect is substantially less than a 
week for females and young workers, more than a week for older males, exactly 
one week for all workers according to two studies, and 1.4 to 1.5 weeks accord­
ing to two other studies. In the light of these findings a single best estimate at this 
point is that the duration effect is about a week. Another source of work disincen­
tives is the maximum potential duration of UI benefits. Consider a one-week 
increase in the maximum potential duration of UI benefits. Four of the studies 
reviewed by us estimate that this increase would extend unemployment (or in one 
of the studies, reduce employment) by 0.1 weeks to 0.45 weeks. Two studies that 
found larger effects of 0.61 and 0.8 weeks used compensated weeks of unem­
ployment, which may have overstated the effects on total weeks of unemploy­
ment. Given the preponderance of evidence for modest effects, a best guess at 
this point is that an additional week of potential duration increases a spell of 
unemployment by no more than 0.5 weeks. If one regards weeks of employment 
as a better measure of work disincentives, then the evidence thus far shows that at 
least extended benefits beyond the exhaustion of regular UI benefits has very 
small negative effects on employment.
The empirical evidence on the wage gain aspects of UI is not even in agree­
ment on the existence of such an effect, let alone on its magnitude. This goes to
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the heart of the issue of whether the job search or the leisure subsidy hypothesis is 
the most appropriate for understanding the effects of UI on spells of unemploy­
ment. While some studies show a wage gain, others do not. At the present time 
one can find no compelling evidence in support of the proposition that UI 
increases wages because of better job matches and increased job stability. This 
does not necessarily mean that there are no such effects, but only that significant 
data problems prevent the research community from being able to test for their 
presence properly.
It should be appreciated that different estimated UI effects that merely reflect 
demographic differences are not necessarily a statistical problem. Different 
worker responses to UI can be anticipated when workers differ in their personal 
characteristics. This does, however, present a policy problem because of the 
political and legal difficulties in adopting UI legislation that treats potential 
UI recipients differently depending on their non-job-related personal characteris­
tics.
What are the implications of previous research for the future UI research 
agenda? These implications fall into two categories: (a) appropriate data bases, 
and (b) research topics. Virtually all of the empirical evidence on UI to date is 
derived from nonexperimental sources. These include administrative records and 
household surveys. Few of the authors of these studies have been too inhibited to 
point out severe limitations of the data bases used by others (and sometimes even 
their own!). It seems clear that there is a consensus that using data based on only 
compensated spells of unemployment introduces unacceptable estimation biases 
when analyzing total duration of unemployment spells. But even with household 
survey data that yield information on completed spells of unemployment, there 
are too many important factors that go unobserved. These include the length of a 
worker’s search horizon, the worker’s discounting rate of interest, and a worker’s 
search costs.
An essential concept of the search paradigm that provides the theoretical basis 
for most of the UI studies on individual worker behavior is the reservation wage. 
Yet this theoretical construct is not observed in the data. What about the question 
in the May 1976 CPS that asked unemployed workers to state the lowest wage 
they would accept for the kind of job they were seeking? We maintain that there 
is no basis for interpreting the answers to this question as corresponding to the 
theoretical notion of a reservation wage. In their actual job acceptance decisions, 
workers are in no sense bound by their answers to the reservation wage question. 
One might more plausibly argue that the answer to this question reflects a hoped- 
for or desired wage. Consistent with this view is the evidence found in Feldstein 
and Poterba (1984) that shows little or no decay in the ratio of stated reservation 
wages to the previous wage with the number of weeks the individual had been 
unemployed. Accordingly, we are not prepared to draw any policy conclusions 
from the magnitude of the estimated UI effect on the reported reservation wage in
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the Feldstein and Poterba study. This is an important issue because in the search 
paradigm it is the effect of UI on the reservation wage that produces the associa­
tion between UI and the duration of unemployment. The absence of data on this 
variable could potentially be managed if one could observe all offers received by 
an unemployed worker instead of only the accepted offer. Unfortunately, tradi­
tional data sources do not provide information on all offers received.
One of the significant advantages of controlled experiments is that they can 
make some variables observable that would otherwise be unobservable. This is 
especially true of laboratory experiments in which such factors as the feasibility 
of recalling past wage offers, the length of the search horizon, and agent informa­
tion about the distribution of wage offers are controllable and therefore observ­
able. These theoretical determinants of job search behavior are inherently unob­
servable in nonexperimental data sources and difficult or impossible to observe in 
field experiment data sources. Although fewer variables are observable in field 
experiments than in laboratory experiments, the former have the obvious advan­
tage of being conducted in an environment that is closer to the naturally occurring 
economy in which UI programs actually operate.
The UI research agenda of the future should include the topics described 
below.
The effects of UI on postunemployment earnings and on the quality of post­
unemployment job matches is still very much an open question. The answer to 
this question bears on how much we regard UI in its traditional role as income 
maintenance for workers on temporary layoff as opposed to its potential role for 
improving the efficiency of job search.
More research is needed to determine what effects UI has on search intensity. 
Changes in the UI system to provide monetary incentives to shorten the duration 
of UI claims may possibly work through some combination of lowering the 
reservation wage and increasing job search intensity. The fear some may have 
about the former is that poorer job matches may be encouraged.
If UI is found to raise postunemployment earnings through better job matches, 
then a cost-benefit analysis should be performed to determine whether the social 
gains offset the social costs of longer job searches.
The incentive effects of UI over the business cycle need to be examined more 
systematically. It seems reasonable to suppose that an additional dollar of UI 
benefits or an additional week of maximum potential duration will have different 
effects on search outcomes depending upon where the economy is in the business 
cycle.
Moffitt (1985) makes a convincing case for the value of improved modeling of 
the dynamics of the search process of unemployed workers as time-varying 
variables such as potential duration and the unemployment rate change during the 
search process. Changes in these factors can influence the efficacy of UI policy. 
This topic is related to the immediately preceding one.
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More research is needed on the formal modeling and empirical testing of 
simultaneous search by firms for workers and search by workers for jobs. How 
does the UI system simultaneously affect both sides of the labor market?
Without awaiting the definitive work on the effects of UI on work incentives, 
there are some policy implications that can be raised at this point. If the UI 
system were found to produce better job matches, then why should there be a 
public subsidy to productive job search? A divergence between private and social 
gains could be one justification. The existence of imperfect capital markets might 
be a justification for a public subsidy. As argued in Classen (1977), such a 
justification need not require outright UI grants. Rather, one could make an 
argument that a subsidized unemployment loan program could address the prob­
lem of imperfect capital markets.
Policymakers are continually faced with the task of limiting the benefit costs 
of the UI programs. To the extent that the costs of the UI program are ultimately 
borne by employers and by workers in the covered sector, both parties have an 
interest in cost-effective UI plans. Aggregate benefit costs could be lowered by 
legislating reduced weekly benefit amounts and/or maximum weeks of UI en­
titlement. However, such measures would degrade the adequacy of UI benefits as 
an effective form of income maintenance during temporary spells of unemploy­
ment. Another cost-saving measure would be to tighten up on eligibility require­
ments in the nonmonetary determinations. This already occurs to some extent 
because claims deputies can give closer scrutiny to UI claims without the need 
for formal legislative changes.
The desire to reduce both the transfer payments of UI and its administrative 
costs can be accommodated by making the program function more like insurance 
rather than as income maintenance. The reemployment bonus payment plan is a 
step in this direction. There are of course the usual moral hazard problems to be 
concerned with. Furthermore, the results from completed UI bonus field experi­
ments have not provided adequate evidence to support the conclusion that a 
permanent reemployment bonus program would be cost-effective.
Given the likelihood that the effects of the UI system are not invariant over the 
business cycle, it is unfortunate that the current UI system offers little flexibility 
in dealing with this issue. About the only automatic response is the Extended 
Benefits (EB) program, which is triggered by a state’s insured unemployment 
rate reaching 6% for states with such provisions or a 5% rate that is at least 20% 
higher than the average for the corresponding period in the previous two years. 
One could imagine different UI payment schedules being triggered by a high 
unemployment rate. For example, consider a UI bonus plan in which a job 
acceptance bonus declines the longer a UI claimant goes without accepting a job. 
One possibility is that the UI bonus payment decreases at an increasing rate. This 
plan would provide the strongest incentives to accept an offer early in the spell of 
unemployment. This seems to be appropriate for periods of relatively low unem­
ployment when the probabilities of receiving job offers are high. In periods of
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high unemployment the incentive for early job acceptance would be frustrated by 
the low probabilities of receiving job offers. During these periods it might be 
more effective to implement a UI bonus payment schedule that provided more 
incentive farther along in a worker’s spell of unemployment. Such a plan would 
offer a UI bonus schedule that declined at a decreasing rate during a spell of 
insured unemployment.
We believe that such plans as we have discussed above are feasible and could 
meet the objective of adequate income maintenance assistance for the involun­
tarily unemployed without unacceptable work disincentives. They would be 
good candidates for inclusion in future field experiments.
Other future field experiments should be designed so as to not be subject to the 
major shortcoming of the present experiments that we discussed in detail in 
Section III. This shortcoming is that the results of the completed and in-progress 
experiments with reemployment bonuses, etc., may not be good predictors of the 
effects of a permanent policy because of differences in the feasibility of strategic 
responses by workers and firms. There is no low-cost solution to this experimen­
tal design problem. In order to incorporate in an experiment the same possibility 
for strategic responses that would exist with a permanent program the experiment 
must continue for a longer time period than has previously been tried with UI 
experiments. Of course, the incentive features of the experimental treatments 
would also need to be widely advertised.
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